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Abstract: We argue that, in a simple setting, the relation between
the intensity of competition and cost-reducing investment is U-shaped.
We consider a two-stage game with cost-reducing investments followed
by a linear diﬀerentiated Cournot duopoly. We first show that, except
for firms that are much less eﬃcient than the competitor, investment
in the subgame-perfect equilibrium is minimal for intermediate lev-
els of competition, which is inversely parameterized by the extent of
product diﬀerentiation. An extensive set of laboratory experiments
also provides support for the U-shape, both for symmetric firms and
for leaders. Also consistent with predictions, the relation is negative
for firms that are lagging behind.
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1 Introduction
A large game-theoretic literature deals with strategic investment decisions
in an oligopolistic environment. One important class of papers focuses on
the relation between the intensity of competition and process investment,
typically using two-stage oligopoly games. This relation is generally regarded
as ambiguous; depending on the precise definition of competitive intensity
and the particular oligopolistic environment, competition may have positive
or negative eﬀects on investment (Gilbert 2006; Schmutzler 2007; Vives 2008,
forthcoming). In a general equilibrium setting, it has been argued that an
inverse U-shaped relation is also conceivable (Aghion et al., 2005). This paper
provides the surprising result that in a simple partial equilibrium framework
a direct (non-inverted) U-relation between competition and investment can
emerge, and it provides experimental support for the claim.
We consider a simple standard model: In the first stage of the game,
duopolists choose cost-reducing investments; in the second stage, they engage
in diﬀerentiated Cournot competition with linear inverse demand functions
pi = a− qi− bqj, where b ∈ [0, 1]. An increase in competition corresponds to
a reduction in product diﬀerentiation (higher value of b). Thus, in the polar
case where b = 0 there are essentially two monopolies; b = 1 corresponds
to a homogeneous Cournot market. For symmetric firms, that is, identi-
cal initial marginal costs, an increase in competition reduces investments as
long as product diﬀerentiation remains suﬃciently strong; as products be-
come suﬃciently similar, however, a further increase in competition raises
investments. This U-shape becomes even more pronounced for firms that
are initially ahead of the competitors. However, if a firm lags substantially
behind the competitor, increasing intensity of competition has an unambigu-
ously negative eﬀect on investments.
Thus, our model makes two main points. First, there is a U-shaped re-
lation between intensity of competition and investment for a wide range of
parameters; second, competition is more likely to have a negative eﬀect on
investments for strong laggards. As both points are made in a standard,
but nevertheless rather specific model, it is important to understand the in-
tuition. To this end, it is crucial to analyze the eﬀects of the intensity of
competition on marginal investment incentives, that is, the absolute value of
the derivative of equilibrium profits (gross of investment costs) with respect
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to own marginal costs.1 This marginal investment incentive itself depends in
a non-monotone way on the competition parameter, reflecting the interaction
of two countervailing eﬀects. First, in the diﬀerentiated Cournot model, as
in most reasonable cases, competition has a negative eﬀect on the absolute
mark-up that a firm can command in equilibrium. Hence, the positive ef-
fect on equilibrium demand that comes from a cost-reducing investment is
less valuable. This points to a negative eﬀect of competition on marginal
investment incentives. However, as competition increases, the positive de-
mand eﬀect of increasing eﬃciency becomes more pronounced, suggesting a
positive relation between competition and marginal investment incentives.
The U-shape thus comes from the interaction of these two eﬀects.
The diﬀerence between leaders and laggards can be explained similarly.
Essentially, while both eﬀects are still present for strong laggards, the positive
eﬀect becomes small for a firm that has a low demand because it is less
eﬃcient than the competitor.
The paper also provides experimental evidence that supports the main
results. In view of the simple structure of the model, we implement the
experiment as a one-stage game where players choose investments, and then
obtain the equilibrium profits corresponding to the resulting product market
subgame.2 We carried out a large number of experiments to identify the
U-shaped relation between intensity of competition and investment and its
robustness. We considered both symmetric and asymmetric settings. In
both cases, we compared the investments for weak competition (b = 1/10)
to intermediate competition (b = 2/3) and strong competition (b = 1). In
the symmetric case, investments are lowest for intermediate competition,
as predicted. However, there is overinvestment for all values of b. In the
asymmetric case, the U-shaped relation arises for leaders, but the positive
eﬀect of moving from intermediate to strong competition is not as intense
as predicted. For laggards, the predicted negative eﬀect of competition on
investment holds, but it is also less pronounced. Interestingly, to a large
extent, these deviations reflect best responses to wrong beliefs that players
have about the investments of the other subjects. That is, symmetric players
1When investment incentives are increasing, investments in the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of the game are also increasing under fairly weak additional conditions (see
Schmutzler, 2007).
2For the diﬀerentiated Cournot-Duopoly with symmetric players, Sacco (2008) com-
pares one-stage with two-stage experiments, where subjects take investment and quantity
decisions.
2
and laggards believe that the competitor invests less than he actually does;
rather, leaders believe than the competitor invests more than he actually
does.
Though the focus is on the eﬀects of competition on investment, our
analysis also provides some insights into a related debate. A large literature
has dealt with the issue of self-reinforcing market dominance. When firms dif-
fer in their initial eﬃciency levels, is there a tendency for these diﬀerences to
become larger over time? The theoretical literature has identified forces that
go in both directions (see Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). Though our model
is only static, one of the key mechanisms for weak increasing dominance is
present: Firms that are initially more eﬃcient than others invest more. The
asymmetric treatments of our experiments allow us to test whether increasing
dominance actually arises. Indeed, this question is answered in the aﬃrma-
tive, essentially independent of the degree of competition. However, because
leaders underinvest and laggards overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium,
the diﬀerence between the investments of leaders and laggards is obviously
smaller than predicted by the model.
While the theoretical analysis of oligopolistic investment models is well
established, the experimental analysis is still in its infancy. Except for two
early contributions of Isaac and Reynolds (1988, 1992) which deal with patent
races and show that an increase in competition in the sense of a larger num-
ber of firms has a negative eﬀect on investments, most of the literature has
only developed recently. Sacco and Schmutzler (2008) consider homogenous
Cournot and Bertrand settings with two and four firms.3 Consistent with
the earlier literature, they show that a larger number of firms lowers invest-
ments, whereas increasing competition in the sense of moving from Cournot
to Bertrand has a positive eﬀect on investments.
The first experimental paper that analyzes whether weak increasing dom-
inance emerges is Halbheer et al. (2007). These authors also identify weak
increasing dominance in a simple static Cournot model. They treat the ho-
mogenous case allowing for parameterizations reflecting spillovers between
firms.
In this paper, we proceed as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical
framework. Section 3 discusses the experimental design and results. Section
4 concludes.
3Suetens (2005) deals with a Cournot-Duopoly. However, she is not concerned with
the eﬀects of increasing competition.
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2 The Model
2.1 Diﬀerentiated Cournot-Duopoly
Consider firms i = 1, 2 producing heterogenous goods. Suppose without loss
of generality that c1 ≤ c2. If the inequality strictly holds, then firm 1 plays
the leader’s role; firm 2 is the laggard. Otherwise, firms are symmetric. The
inverse demand functions are given by
pi = a− qi − bqj, i 6= j, (1)
where b ∈ [0, 1] , and a > 0.
For b = 0, equation (1) implies that both firms are monopolists. The
other polar case b = 1 corresponds to a homogenous Cournot market. Thus,
the higher b the higher the intensity of competition.
From profit maximization, the equilibrium quantity of firm i is given by
qi =
2Yi − bYj
4− b2 , (2)
where Yi ≡ a− ci > 0 represents the eﬃciency level.4
(2) implies the following equilibrium profits:
Πi =
µ
2Yi − bYj
4− b2
¶2
. (3)
The cost reduction incentives are given by
∂Πi
∂ci
= −8Yi − 4bYj
(4− b2)2
= − 4qi
4− b2 < 0. (4)
Given qi > 0 and b ∈ [0, 1] , we have ∂Πi∂ci < 0, which means that a cost
reduction increases firms’ profits.
The eﬀect of the intensity of competition on marginal incentives to invest
is captured by
∂2Πi
∂ci∂b
=
(16 + 12b2)Yj − 32bYi
(4− b2)3
. (5)
Investigation of (5) yields Proposition 1.
4For the leader and symmetric firms, (2) is always positive; for the laggard, if b < 2Y2Y1 .
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Proposition 1 Suppose 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a. Then, the
following holds: (i) For the leader, there is a U-shaped relation between the
intensity of competition and marginal incentives to invest, with the minimum
at 0 < b ≤ 2
3
. (ii) For the laggard, there is a U-shaped relation with the
minimum at 2
3
≤ b ≤ 1 if Y1Y2 ≤
8
7
. (iii) If Y1Y2 >
8
7
, the marginal incentives
for the laggard are strictly decreasing. (iv) For symmetric firms, there is a
U-shaped relation with the minimum at b = 2
3
.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is straightforward to see from Proposition 1 that, for the laggard, the
U-shaped relation is only given when c1 and c2 are suﬃciently close.
2.2 The Investment Game
Consider now a two-stage game, where firms i = 1, 2 first engage in cost-
reducing investments and then compete in the product market. The inverse
demand functions are given by (1). Initial marginal costs are denoted as c0i
and corresponding eﬃciency levels as Y 0i ≡ a − c0i > 0. In the following,
we assume c01 ≤ c02; thus, Y 01 ≥ Y 02 . In the first stage, firms simultaneously
choose investments yi ∈ [0, c0i ), resulting in marginal costs ci = c0i − yi. The
eﬃciency level of firm i after the investment stage is given by Yi = Y 0i + yi.
The investment costs are quadratic and given by ky2i , where k > 0. In the
second stage, firms simultaneously choose quantities, that is, they compete
à la Cournot.
According to (3), the net profit of firm i = 1, 2 in the first stage of the
game is given by
Πi =
µ
2(Y 0i + yi)− b(Y 0j + yj)
4− b2
¶2
− ky2i , i 6= j. (6)
The maximization of (6) with respect to yi leads to
∂Πi
∂yi
=
8 (Y 0i + yi)− 4b
¡
Y 0j + yj
¢
(4− b2)2
− 2kyi ≡ 0. (7)
The second-order condition is given by
∂2Πi
∂y2i
=
8
(4− b2)2
− 2k < 0. (8)
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Note that (8) is fulfilled ∀b ∈ [0, 1] if k > 4
9
.
From (7), it follows that
yi =
4Y 0i − 2b
¡
Y 0j + yj
¢
k (4− b2)2 − 4
. (9)
Relation (9) implies the following equilibrium investments:
y∗i =
(4 + 4b2k − 16k)Y 0i + (8bk − 2b3k)Y 0j
8k(4− b2)− k2 (4− b2)3 − 4
. (10)
Note that (10) is positive if Y 0i and Y 0j are suﬃciently close.5
The diﬀerence between leader’s and laggard’s equilibrium investments is
given by
y∗1 − y∗2 =
2(c01 − c02)
k(b− 2)(4− b2) + 2 . (11)
Note that (11) is positive ∀c01 < c02, ∀b ∈ [0, 1] , and ∀k > 0.6 That is, the
firm that is initially more eﬃcient invests more than the other firm, implying
that increasing dominance arises.
2.3 Choosing the Parameters
In this section, we consider a specific parameterization that we also use in
the experiment. We first treat the asymmetric case. Let a = 50, k = 1,
c01 = 21, c02 = 25. For these parameters,
Y 01
Y 02
=
a− c01
a− c02
=
29
25
>
8
7
. (12)
For the leader, there is a U-shaped relation between intensity of competi-
tion and incentives to invest by Proposition 1. For the laggard, (12) implies
strictly decreasing investments.7 Figure 1 shows the plots of the leader’s and
laggard’s equilibrium investments for b ∈ [0, 1] .
5For instance, consider b = 1 and k = 1. Then, (10) is positive if Y
0
i
Y 0j
> 34 .
6For c01 = c02, (11) is obviously zero.
7Actually, to ensure that laggard’s investments are strictly decreasing, ex-ante marginal
costs may be less close than stated in Proposition 1. This can be shown through the
derivative of (10) for i = 2 with respect to b; (12) becomes Y
0
1
Y 02
≥ 124121 .
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Figure 1: Leader’s and laggard’s investments.
In the experiment, we consider three cases for b, which correspond to
diﬀerent intensities of competition: b = 1/10 (weak), b = 2/3 (intermediate),
and b = 1 (strong). For the leader, the equilibrium investments are as follows:
⎧
⎨
⎩
b = 1/10⇒ y∗1 = 9.18
b = 2/3⇒ y∗1 = 8.68
b = 1⇒ y∗1 = 11.70
. (13)
For the laggard, we have:
⎧
⎨
⎩
b = 1/10⇒ y∗2 = 7.75
b = 2/3⇒ y∗2 = 5.75
b = 1⇒ y∗2 = 3.70
. (14)
Consider now the symmetric case. Figure 2 shows the plot of the equilib-
rium investments for a = 50, k = 1, c01 = c02 = 21, and b ∈ [0, 1] .
For the three values of the competition parameter b, the following equi-
librium investments y∗1 = y∗2 = y∗ arise:
⎧
⎨
⎩
b = 1/10⇒ y∗ = 9.09
b = 2/3⇒ y∗ = 7.75
b = 1⇒ y∗ = 8.28
. (15)
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Figure 2: Investments of the symmetric firms.
For both firms, there is a U-shaped relation between intensity of compe-
tition and investments.8
3 The Experiment
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
The game implemented in the experiment is a reduced form version of the de-
scribed two-stage game. To focus on investment choices which we restricted
to yi ∈ {0, 1, ..., 14}, we reduced the game to the first stage, that is, to the
investment stage. We did not model the product market stage explicitly.
Instead, for each investment profile, players earned the unique Nash equilib-
rium profits of the corresponding subgame. This was a deliberate modeling
choice ensuring that, whatever deviations from the equilibrium investments
might arise, they do not result from anticipations of second-period deviations
from the product market equilibrium.
In October and November 2007, we conducted eight experimental sessions
at the University of Zurich. The participants were undergraduate students
from various disciplines. In the first four sessions, we implemented the sym-
8By Proposition 1, the minimum of the investment function lies at b = 2/3.
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metric case; in the last four, the asymmetric case with the leader-laggard
structure. Each session had 20 periods. In each session, there was a switch
of the competition parameter after period 10. That is, participants played
the game for one parameterization in the first ten periods and for the other
parameterization in the second ten periods. In diﬀerent sessions, we reversed
the order of the parameterizations to allow for sequencing eﬀects. Table 1
gives an overview of the sessions.
Symmetric/Asymmetric Period 1-10 Period 11-20
S1/A1 b = 0.1 b = 0.67
S2/A2 b = 0.67 b = 0.1
S3/A3 b = 0.67 b = 1
S4/A4 b = 1 b = 0.67
Table 1: Four symmetric and four asymmetric sessions.
In seven of eight sessions, there were 36 subjects.9 This led to a total of
5640 investment observations. Moreover, in each period, subjects were asked
to give a belief about the investment of the other group member.
In the asymmetric sessions, the roles of leader and laggard were randomly
assigned and there was no switch over the 20 periods. No subject participated
in more than one session. We built fixed matching groups of 6 people for
statistical reasons. The participants were randomly matched into groups of
size two within the matching groups. At the end of each period, subjects
were informed about the investment level of the other group member and
their own net profit for that period. In each session, participants received an
initial endowment of CHF 20 (≈EUR 12). Average earnings including the
endowment were CHF 38 (≈EUR 24) for S1 and S2, and CHF 30 (≈EUR
19) for S3 and S4. In A1 and A2, average earnings were CHF 40 (≈EUR 25)
and CHF 32 (≈EUR 20) for leaders and laggards, respectively. In A3 and
A4, leaders earned on average CHF 35 (≈EUR 22); laggards CHF 24 (≈EUR
15). Sessions lasted about 2 hours each. The experiment was programmed
and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
9In S3, there were 30 participants.
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3.2 Results
In this section, we discuss the experimental results. To analyze the eﬀects of
varying the intensity of competition on the investment behavior, we consider
three diﬀerent parameterizations (b = 1/10, b = 2/3, b = 1) . First, we treat
the asymmetric setting; second, the symmetric case.
3.2.1 The Asymmetric Setting
In the following, we analyze the first ten and the last ten periods of the
four asymmetric sessions in turn. After that, to focus on sequencing eﬀects,
we compare A1 to A2, and A3 to A4; that is, we consider pairs of sessions
which include the same values of b, but diﬀer with respect to the order of the
parameterizations.
Investments in the two period ranges The theoretical prediction is
that leaders invest more than laggards. Further, for leaders, there is a U-
shaped relation between intensity of competition and investment; for lag-
gards, there is a negative relation. The experiment provides evidence for
these predictions both for the first ten and for the last ten periods. However,
the strength of the U-shaped relation is diﬀerent for the two period ranges.
We start with the first period range.
Result 1 In the first ten periods, leaders invest more than laggards. Leaders’
investments are lowest for intermediate competition. Laggards’ investments
strictly decrease with increasing intensity of competition.
Figure 3 reveals that increasing dominance arises. For all values of b, a re-
gression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show high significance
(p < 0.01) when considering the diﬀerence between leaders’ and laggards’ in-
vestments. Further, for leaders, there is underinvestment when competition
is strong (b = 1) ; for laggards, there is overinvestment when competition
is intermediate and strong (b = 0.67, b = 1) . A regression over a constant
shows that, for leaders, there is no significant diﬀerence between investments
and Nash equilibrium for b = 0.1 and b = 0.67. However, this result is not
fully supported by a Wilcoxon rank sum test which yields significance at the
10%-level. On the other hand, the diﬀerence between actual and equilibrium
investments is highly significant when competition is strong. For laggards,
10
Period 1-10
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
b=0.1 b=0.67 b=1
Mean Inv. Leader Mean Inv. Laggard Equilibrium Leader Equilibrium Laggard
Figure 3: Leaders’ and laggards’ investment in period 1-10.
there is no significant deviation from the equilibrium for b = 0.1; high signif-
icance is given for b = 0.67 and b = 1. These deviations from the equilibrium
can be explained through players’ beliefs.10
Leaders believe that laggards invest more than they actually do. This is
shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, given the wrong beliefs, leaders essentially
choose the optimal investment level. In fact, the best response to the own
beliefs almost coincides with actual investments; a regression over a constant
and aWilcoxon rank sum test yield no significant diﬀerence. Rather, laggards
believe that leaders invest less than they actually do. This explains the
overinvestment of the laggards. However, their investments are even higher
than the best response to the wrong beliefs. The asymmetry between leaders
and laggards — the former best-respond to their beliefs while the laggards do
not — is astonishing. One explanation may be that laggards deliberately hurt
leaders who have an exogenous advantage.
We consider now the last ten periods. The investment behavior is similar
to that discussed above.
Result 2 In the last ten periods, leaders invest more than laggards. Leaders’
investments are lowest for intermediate competition. Laggards’ investments
10Observe that own investments and beliefs about other players’ investments are strate-
gic substitutes.
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Period 1-10
3
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7
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11
12
b=0.1 b=0.67 b=1
Mean Bel. Leader Mean Bel. Laggard Mean Inv. Leader
Mean Inv. Laggard Best Resp. Leader Best Resp. Laggard
Figure 4: Leaders’ and laggards’ belief in period 1-10.
strictly decrease with increasing intensity of competition.
Figure 5 shows that, like in the first ten periods, increasing dominance
emerges. The diﬀerence between leaders’ and laggards’ investments is highly
significant for each parameterization.11 Moreover, for leaders, there is slight
overinvestment when competition is weak and intermediate, and striking un-
derinvestment for strong competition. For laggards, there is overinvestment
for all values of b. Regarding the deviation from the equilibrium, a regres-
sion over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test yield high significance for
each parameter value and player’s role. Again, subjects’ beliefs are helpful
to understand the investment behavior.
Figure 6 reveals that, for leaders, the underinvestment for b = 1 is related
to wrong beliefs about laggards’ investments. However, in contrast to the first
ten periods, wrong beliefs do not fully explain the underinvestment behavior.
In fact, investments of leaders are even lower than the best response to the
own overestimated beliefs. Further, for laggards, the overinvestment results
from underestimating leaders’ investments. Like in the first ten periods,
laggards invest even more than the best response to the wrong beliefs.
Results 1 and 2 have shown that, for leaders, a U-shaped relation emerges;
for laggards, there is a negative relation. To test how strong these relations
11This is supported both by a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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b=0.1 b=0.67 b=1
Mean Inv. Leader Mean Inv. Laggard Equilibrium Leader Equilibrium Laggard
Figure 5: Leaders’ and laggards’ investment in period 11-20.
Period 11-20
3
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10
11
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b=0.1 b=0.67 b=1
Mean Bel. Leader Mean Bel. Laggard Mean Inv. Leader
Mean Inv. Laggard Best Resp. Leader Best Resp. Laggard
Figure 6: Leaders’ and laggards’ belief in period 11-20.
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are, we consider the following random-eﬀects model:
Y it,k = β0 + β1δ
i
weak,k + β2δ
i
strong,k + e
i
t,k + μ
i
k, (16)
where eit,k is a residual term which is independent across groups k; μ
i
k,
which captures the random eﬀects, is uncorrelated with each explanatory
variable in all time periods. The dummy variable δiweak,k takes the value 1 if
the investment of subject i belonging to group k occurs in the first ten periods
of A1 or in the last ten periods of A2, where the intensity of competition is
weak. Otherwise, it takes the value 0. Similarly, δistrong,k takes the value 1 if
b = 1.
Estimates are shown in Table 2. The reference variable is intermediate
competition. First, consider leaders. For period 1 to 10, the coeﬃcients
related to weak and strong are positive and significant at the 5% and 1%-level,
respectively. Investments for b = 0.1 are 0.6611 units higher than for b = 0.67;
those for b = 1 are 1.7666 units higher than for b = 0.67. This implies that
the U-shaped relation is quite strong even though there is underinvestment
for b = 1. Rather, in period 11 to 20, we denote a clearly weaker relationship.
The coeﬃcients for weak and strong are positive and significant at the 10%-
level. Thus, for b = 1, underinvestment is more pronounced in the last ten
periods. Second, consider laggards. The negative relation is substantial in
each period range. The coeﬃcients for weak are positive and significant at the
5% and 1%-level, respectively; those for strong are negative and significant
at the 1% and 5%-level, respectively.
Table 2: Eﬀects of the intensity of competition on the investment behavior.
Period 1-10 Period 11-20 Period 1-10 Period 11-20
Variable Leader Leader Laggard Laggard
const
8.5944∗∗∗
(0.2593)
8.8972∗∗∗
(0.2694)
7.0333∗∗∗
(0.2790)
6.4416∗∗∗
(0.2539)
weak
0.6611∗∗
(0.4041)
0.4361∗
(0.4659)
0.7944∗∗
(0.3969)
2.1416∗∗∗
(0.4657)
strong
1.7666∗∗∗
(0.4367)
0.5027∗
(0.4898)
−1.2722∗∗∗
(0.5254)
−0.8194∗∗
(0.4927)
Note: Random-eﬀects GLS regression. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the
5%-level, *** at the 1%-level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
We can now summarize the findings related to Table 2 in the following
result.
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Result 3 For leaders, the U-shaped relation is stronger in the first ten than
in the last ten periods. For laggards, the negative relation is strong no matter
what period range is considered.
Sequencing eﬀects So far we have discussed the investment behavior in
the two period ranges. In the following, we analyze whether sessions involving
the same values of b but a diﬀerent order of the parameterizations lead to
similar results. To this end, we compare the investment distributions in A1
to those in A2. Analogously, for A3 and A4. Dealing with the investment
distributions also allows us to highlight the heterogeneity of player behavior.
We start with A1 and A2, where b = 0.1 and b = 0.67 are the relevant
parameters.
Result 4 For A1 and A2, more intense competition shifts the leaders’ and
laggards’ investment distribution to the left.
According to prediction, leaders and laggards choose in both sessions
higher investments when competition is less intense. This holds no matter
what competition parameter is implemented first. For leaders, the investment
distributions in A1 are shown in Figure 7.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Investment
Pe
rc
en
t
Leader (b=0.1) Leader (b=0.67)
Figure 7: Leaders’ investment distributions in A1.
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Switching from weak to intermediate competition shifts the global max-
imum from 9 (34%) to 8 (56%). For laggards, the investment distributions
in A1 are shown in Figure 8. More intense competition shifts the global
maximum from 8 (47%) to 6 (54%).
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Figure 8: Laggards’ investment distributions in A1.
The analysis of A2, where the parameterization order is reversed, leads
to very similar results. We therefore omit additional considerations related
to A2.
In the following, we investigate sessions A3 and A4, where the parameters
involved are b = 0.67 and b = 1.
Result 5 For A3 and A4, more intense competition shifts the laggards’ in-
vestment distribution to the left; the shift of the leaders’ distribution to the
right is more pronounced in A4 than in A3.
According to prediction, in both sessions laggards choose lower invest-
ments when competition is more intense. For leaders, there is a diﬀerence
between A3 and A4. Consistent with Result 3, the distribution in A3 does
not clearly shift to the right with increasing competition. The parameter
switch in A4 has a greater impact on investments of leaders. Figure 9 shows
the leaders’ investment distributions in A4.
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Figure 9: Leaders’ investment distributions in A4.
The switch from strong to intermediate competition shifts the global max-
imum from 11 (23%) to 8 (33%). Figure 10 shows the investment distribu-
tions of laggards in A4. Less intense competition shifts the global maximum
from 4 (19%) to 6 (27%).
3.2.2 The Symmetric Setting
In the following, we consider the symmetric case. Like in the asymmetric
setting, we first analyze the investment behavior in the two period ranges,
then the sequencing eﬀects.
Investments in the two period ranges The theoretical prediction is
that, for both players, there is a U-shaped relation between intensity of com-
petition and investment. The experiment provides evidence for this predic-
tion both for the first ten and last ten periods. Again, like in the asymmetric
setting, the strength of the U-shaped relation is diﬀerent for the two period
ranges.
Result 6 In the first ten periods, investments are lowest for intermediate
competition.
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Figure 10: Laggards’ investment distributions in A4.
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Figure 11: Mean investment in period 1-10.
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Figure 11 reveals that there is overinvestment for all values of b. Both
a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum test show that the
diﬀerence between observed and equilibrium investments is highly significant.
The overinvestment behavior reflects underestimated beliefs.
Period 1-10
7.2
7.6
8.0
8.4
8.8
9.2
9.6
b=0.1 b=0.67 b=1
Mean Belief Mean Investment Best Response
Figure 12: Mean belief in period 1-10.
Figure 12 shows that subjects believe that their group members invest less
than they actually do. However, for b = 0.1 and b = 0.67, mean investments
are even higher than the best response to the wrong beliefs. For b = 1, mean
investments exactly coincide with the best response to the underestimated
beliefs.
Next, we consider the last ten periods, for which the investment behavior
is similar to the other period range.
Result 7 In the last ten periods, investments are lowest for intermediate
competition.
For weak and intermediate competition, Figure 13 indicates overinvest-
ment; for strong competition, there is slight underinvestment. For b = 0.1
and b = 0.67, both a regression over a constant and a Wilcoxon rank sum
test show that the diﬀerence between observed and equilibrium investments
is highly significant. For b = 1, there is no significant diﬀerence.
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Period 11-20
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Figure 13: Mean investment in period 11-20.
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Figure 14: Mean belief in period 11-20.
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For weak and intermediate competition, Figure 14 reveals that the overin-
vestment can be partly explained through the underestimated beliefs. How-
ever, mean investments are even higher than the best response to the wrong
beliefs. For strong competition, the underestimated beliefs do not lead to
overinvestment which would arise by best-responding.
To test the strength of the U-shaped relations shown in Result 6 and 7,
consider the random-eﬀects model given by (16). Estimates are shown in
Table 3.
Table 3: Eﬀects of the intensity of competition on the investment behavior.
Variable Period 1-10 Period 11-20
const
8.3590∗∗∗
(0.1684)
8.0916∗∗∗
(0.1644)
weak
1.1075∗∗∗
(0.2384)
1.4666∗∗∗
(0.2239)
strong
0.3436∗
(0.2715)
0.1050
(0.3502)
Note: Random-eﬀects GLS regression. * denotes significance at the 10%-level, *** at the
1%-level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
For period 1 to 10, the coeﬃcient related to weak is positive and signif-
icant at the 1%-level. The coeﬃcient for strong is positive and significant
at the 10%-level. This means that the decrease in investment is substantial
when switching from weak to intermediate competition; the increase when
switching from intermediate to strong competition is less pronounced. For
period 11 to 20, the coeﬃcient for weak is positive and significant at the 1%-
level; the one for strong is positive but not significant. This implies that the
decrease in investment is strong, the increase extremely weak. Summarizing
we get Result 8.
Result 8 The U-shaped relation is stronger in the first ten than in the last
ten periods.
Sequencing eﬀects In the following, we compare S1 to S2, and S3 to
S4. We start with S1 and S2, where b = 0.1 and b = 0.67 are the relevant
parameters.
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Result 9 For S1 and S2, more intense competition shifts the players’ invest-
ment distribution to the left.
According to prediction, subjects choose in both sessions higher invest-
ments when competition is less intense. For the considered two sessions, the
distributions look similar. Figure 15 concerns S1.
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Figure 15: Investment distributions in S1.
For weak competition, the global maximum is at 9 and chosen in 51%
of the cases. In fact, playing 9 represents a weakly dominant strategy.12
Switching to intermediate competition shifts the global maximum to 8 (32%).
The last considerations refer to S3 and S4, where b = 0.67 and b = 1 are the
parameters involved.
Result 10 For S3 and S4, more intense competition does not unambiguously
shift the players’ investment distribution to the right.
In contrast to prediction, higher intensity of competition does not clearly
lead to higher investments. This is consistent with Result 8. Figure 16, which
refers to S3, shows that the distributions are similar.
12In S1, we have eleven subjects choosing the investment level of 9 in each of the ten
periods, sixteen subjects in at least eight periods. There are 28 subjects which invest on
average between 8 and 10.
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Figure 16: Investment distributions in S3.
4 Conclusion
We have analyzed the eﬀects of varying the intensity of competition on invest-
ment incentives in an experiment, where we implemented a reduced form ver-
sion of a two-stage game. In the first stage, duopolists choose cost-reducing
investments. In the second stage, they choose quantities in a heterogenous
good market. Increasing competition corresponds to decreasing product dif-
ferentiation.
We considered two settings: A symmetric and an asymmetric one. In the
symmetric setting, firms’ initial marginal costs are identical. In the asymmet-
ric setting, there is a leader-laggard structure. The leader has lower marginal
costs ex-ante. We have shown that, for symmetric firms and leaders, there
is a U-shaped relation between the intensity of competition and investment.
If the ex-ante cost diﬀerence between leader and laggard is suﬃciently high,
there is a negative relation for the laggard. Otherwise, the laggard also
exhibits a U-shaped relation. Moreover, the leader invests more than the
laggard; that is, increasing dominance arises.
The experimental sessions mostly support the theoretical predictions. For
symmetric players and leaders, the U-shaped relation emerges; for laggards,
as predicted, there is a negative relation. Moreover, leaders invest more
than laggards, providing evidence for increasing dominance. However, in
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both settings, there are deviations from the equilibrium. To a large extent,
these deviations reflect best responses to wrong beliefs. In the symmetric
setting, there is overinvestment no matter which intensity of competition is
implemented. In the asymmetric setting, leaders underinvest under strong
competition and laggards mostly overinvest.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(5) leads to the following results.
If 2
3
< b ≤ 1 and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a, then ∂
2Π1
∂c1∂b
< 0. Further, (5) has a
unique zero bˆ ∈ (0, 2
3
]. bˆ is given by
bˆ =
4− 2
p
−3Q2 + 4
3Q
, (17)
where Q = Y2Y1 ≤ 1. Thus, Q
2 < 4
3
ensures the existence of bˆ. If Y2Y1 → 1, then
bˆ→ 2
3
.
If 0 ≤ b < 2
3
and 0 < c1 ≤ c2 < a, then ∂
2Π2
∂c2∂b
> 0. Further, ∂
2Π2
∂c2∂b
has a unique zero b˜ ∈
£
2
3
, 1
¤
. b˜ is given by (17), where Q = Y1Y2 . We need
Q2 ≤ 4
3
to ensure the existence of b˜, and Q2 ≤ 64
49
to ensure that b˜ ∈ [0, 1] . If
64
49
< Q2 ≤ 4
3
, then b˜ ∈ (1, 2√
3
]. If Q2 > 4
3
, there is no b˜.
This yields statements (i) to (iv).
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